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Motivating Disjunctivism 
Thomas Lockhart 
Disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception claims that: 
(*) in order to maintain the idea that perceptions allow us to gain knowl-
edge of the world, we have to abandon the idea that a subject currently 
having a veridical perceptual experience would be having the same percep-
tual experience if she were instead having an indistinguishable hallucina-
tion. 
In this paper, I argue that both M.G.F. Martin and John McDowell sub-
scribe to this formulation of disjunctivism, but I argue that their imple-
mentations of it are incompatible. Further, I argue that the objection from 
perceptual content, which some critics have brought against disjunctivism, 
applies only to the variety of disjunctivism that Martin defends. I con-
clude that McDowell's disjunctivism represents a stronger candidate for 
a successful implementation of (*). More importantly, I argue that a 
construal of (*) along the lines proposed by Martin robs disjunctivism 
of its initial promise. 
1. Introduction 
According to the disjunctivist, the history of epistemology has shown 
how difficult it is to hold together the following two thoughts : 
1. In virtue of perception, we can come to know about the world 
around us. 
2. A subject, currently having a veridical perception, is having an ex-
perience which is exactly the same as the experience she would be 
having were she instead having an indistinguishable hallucination. 
The disjunctivist claims that the reason philosophers have found it so 
hard to reconcile these two claims is that it is impossible to do so. In 
this, disjunctivism agrees with scepticism. The sceptic abandons the 
first thought. Instead, disjunctivism urges that if we want to maintain 
the first thought, we must defend a conception of perception which re-
jects (a common understanding of) the second. 
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My focus in this paper will be on the work of the two most influ-
ential contemporary proponents of disjunctivism: M. G. F. Martin and 
John McDowell. My first goal is both to explain the significant differ-
ences between their views and correctly to situate these views so that we 
can see their common core motivation. I'll start by articulating what I 
take to be the core commitments of disjunctivism to which they both 
subscribe. I'll argue that the difference between Martin and McDowell 
can rather fruitfully be understood as a disagreement about the implica-
tions of this core view, and thus a disagreement about what-beyond 
the common core-the disjunctivist is required to defend. Once the ar-
guments of Martin and McDowell are clearly separated, I'll make the 
case that their two positions are, far from being complementary, essen-
tially incompatible. 
Disjunctivism has attracted a lot of attention and criticism. But the 
relationship between McDowell and Martin has been misunderstood 
and therefore this attention and criticism is often misdirected. Some-
times, philosophers assume that Martin and McDowell must be defend-
ing exactly the same view, and so they think that criticisms of the view 
Martin defends must apply also against McDowell. 1 In this paper, I'll 
consider an objection which has been brought against Martin's disjunc-
tivism, and show why it does not cut against the version of disjunctivism 
which McDowell defends. 
I'm not the first to notice that confusion can be avoided if we care-
fully separate Martin's disjunctivism from that of McDowell. For exam-
ple, Byrne and Logue notice the significant differences between the two 
authors. But as Byrne and Logue characterize the views of the two, they 
are compatible and (in one direction) independent: 
Epistemological disjunctivism [which they associate with McDowell] is not 
a rival to metaphysical disjunctivism [Martin]; in fact ... the latter leads nat-
urally if not inexorably to the former. However, epistemological disjuncti-
vism is quite compatible with the denial of metaphysical disjunctivism.2 
1 A good example of this phenomenon is Burge (2005). McDowell, in his 
McDowell (2010) (reprinted in this volume), rightly disowns the view Burge 
ascribes to him. Another good example of this confusion can be found in Travis 
(2005). Travis assumes that the only viable form of disjunctivism is the form 
Martin defends. He notes that this form of disjunctivism is inconsistent with 
views that McDowell elsewhere holds, and so he concludes that, in so far as 
McDowell claims to be a disjunctivist, he is guilty of inconsistency. By the 
end of this paper we'll be in a position to see how this charge is wrong. 
2 Byme/Logue (2008), 67. 
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Byrne and Logue, however, fail to recognize (a) that there is a critical 
sense in which Martin and McDowell are engaged in the same project 
and (b) that when we recognize what they have in common, we can 
clearly see that their views are incompatible. 3 It is precisely this incom-
patibility which I articulate in this paper. 
In §2 I argue that at the heart of disjunctivism is the following 
thought: 
(*) in order to maintain the idea that perceptions allow us to gain knowl-
edge of the world, we have to abandon the idea that a subject currently 
having a veridical perception would be having the same perceptual expe-
rience if she were instead to be having an indistinguishable hallucination. 
Martin and McDowell have very different arguments for (*). In §3, I 
argue that Martin believes that in order to defend (*), the disjunctivist 
will have to insist that there is no non-trivial sense in which veridical 
and non-veridical perceptions have anything 'in common', and I re-
hearse his argument for this claim. In §4, I show that McDowell's im-
plementation of(*) does not require such a claim. In §5, I argue for the 
following three claims: (a) that Martin will have to reject any view ac-
cording to which perceptions have any kind of representational or con-
ceptual content, (b) that McDowell's disjunctivism can and must have 
3 Byrne and Logue see Martin's position as the more interesting contender for the 
title 'disjunctivism' because it enters a bold metaphysical claim about the nature 
of perceptual experience, whereas they see McDowell as merely making a point 
about the epistemological status of veridical and non-veridical perceptual expe-
rience. But if I am right, McDowell is no less interested in the nature of verid-
ical perceptual experience-indeed, his claim about the epistemological creden-
tials of veridical perceptual experience follows from a claim about what a verid-
ical perceptual experience is (Byrne and Logue seem to lose track of this in their 
eagerness to mark a distinction between the two authors). Haddock and Mac-
pherson also distinguish between McDowell's disjunctivism and that of Martin, 
and follow Byrne and Logue in labelling McDowell's disjunctivism 'epistemo-
logical' (Haddock and Macpherson are somewhat more nuanced in their discus-
sion of the relative implications between the views-see Haddock/ Macpherson 
(2008b), 12£ and 17 £). It is certainly open to these authors to discriminate and 
label the forms of disjunctivism as they do. My point in this paper is that this 
kind of labelling runs the risk of losing track of the sense in which Martin 
and McDowell are incompatibly attempting to implement the same core 
idea. Excessive attention to the differences between the various species of dis-
junctivism runs the risk of overlooking or trivializing the sense in which they 
are all species of the same genus. 
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room for the idea that perceptions themselves have conceptual content,4 
and (c) that McDowell has a ready way to reject Martin's argument that 
there is no non-trivial sense in which veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptions have 'something in common'. I'll conclude in §6 by suggesting 
that this means that McDowell's is a more promising implementation of 
the basic idea of disjunctivism. 
2. The Basic Claim of Disjunctivism 
Before beginning to see the differences between the two philosophers I 
consider in this paper, I start by offering a characterization of the basic 
insight at the heart of disjunctivism-an insight which I take Martin and 
McDowell both to want to be able to claim for their respective versions 
of disjunctivism. 5 
It is (or it should be) a truism that in virtue of perceptual experience 
we can have access to the world around us. One of the tasks facing the 
philosopher of perception is to articulate a conception of perception 
which will allow us to maintain this truism in the face of arguments 
which seem to deprive us of the resources we need to defend it. 
Consider three perceptual experiences Smith might have. First, she 
might see a lemon6 in her kitchen. Second, she might see a perfect wax 
copy of a lemon in her kitchen. Third, she might hallucinate a lemon in 
her kitchen. If the illusion or the hallucination is good enough, then 
Smith won't be able to distinguish it from a veridical perceptual expe-
rience of a lemon; that is, we can imagine a situation in which Smith 
4 McDowell's disjunctivism can make room for the idea that experiences them-
selves have propositional content. However, McDowell's own current view 
about the content of perceptual experience is weaker-perceptual experiences 
'draw on' conceptual capacities. See McDowell (2008a). As we'll see, even this 
view would be incompatible with Martin's disjunctivism. 
5 I don't argue directly for the claim that the presentation of the basic idea of dis-
junctivism I offer in this section is correct-instead, the definition is supposed 
to prove its worth by its fruitfulness in helping us to see a common background 
against which emerges the sense in which McDowell and Martin are attempting 
to implement the same project in incompatible ways. Finding a properly gener-
ic characterization of disjunctivism matters not only in order to clearly identify 
the specific difference which distinguishes Martin's variant from McDowell's 
but also in order to frame the genus in such a way that one can see how it ap-
plies to other areas of philosophy. 
6 To use a canonical example. 
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cannot tell whether she is having a veridical perceptual experience of a 
lemon or a non-veridical perception of a lemon. This has led philoso-
phers to conclude that we are forced to accede to some version of an 
indistinguishability thesis regarding the relation between veridical and 
non-veridical experiences. So let us, for the moment, accept some ver-
sion of the following, intentionally vaguely-worded, version of such a 
thesis: 
IND Suppose a subject is currently having a veridical perception. If, in-
stead, she were to be having a sufficiently impressive non-veridical percep-
tion, her experience would be, to her, indistinguishable from the experi-
ence she is currently having. 
One familiar tendency amongst epistemologists is to take this observa-
tion to show that there is some common item that figures in the sub-
ject's experience in both cases. I will call this way of further specifying 
the implicit commitments involved in such an indistinguishability thesis, 
via the postulation of a common experiential component, the traditional 
epistemologist's conception if an apparent perception. Thus we arrive at the 
following way of specifying the concept of an apparent perception: 
TAP An apparent perception of <pis the component in a subject's experi-
ence which figures in both a veridical and a non-veridical perceptual expe-
rience of <p. 
Once we thus introduce the notion of an apparent perception, it is nat-
ural to ask what it is that distinguishes a veridical perception from a non-
veridical perception by asking what it is that a veridical perception has, 
over and above being an apparent perception, that makes it a veridical 
perception. Let's call the following the traditional epistemologist's equation: 
TEE Veridical perception of <p = Apparent perception of <p + x. 
The resulting project (which has preoccupied much of the last few cen-
turies of epistemology) might be summed up by the following question: 
Can we find a non-trivial solution to TEE? Let us say that a philosopher 
who attempts to find a non-trivial solution to TEE subscribes to the con-
junctive conception if perceptual experience (or conjunctivism, for short)-that 
is, a conception of experience according to which a veridical perception 
is an apparent perception (conceived of as the common factor between a 
veridical and non-veridical perception) plus something else. 
The conjunctivist starts by identifying something which he calls 
Smith's 'experience' in terms which abstract from the question whether 
her perception is veridical or not. If we accept this analysis of the notion 
314 Thomas Lockhart 
of an apparent perception (that is, in terms of a TAP), it makes sense to 
ask what additional feature is present in the case of a veridical perception 
over and above this common experience, and thus attempt to analyze a 
veridical perception into a TAP plus x (for some x). According to the 
disjunctivist, if we accept (with the conjunctivist) that Smith has a per-
ceptual experience in the good case which would be, in the required 
sense, exactly the same in the bad case, then we will have to give up 
on the idea that we can have access to the world around us in virtue 
of our perceptual experience. It is important to see that a rejection of 
this way of analyzing the concept of an apparent perception does not 
in itself amount to a rejection of the familiar fact that if Smith were hal-
lucinating she might not be able to tell that she was hallucinating (IND). 
All the disjunctivist claims is that we need not-and should not-con-
clude from the bare fact of IND to the adequacy ofT AP as the analysis 
of the concept of an apparent perception. 
We can perhaps start to see more clearly what the disjunctivist is re-
jecting by first noting the rather different and philosophically less com-
mittal manner in which he seeks to account for the fact that non-verid-
ical perceptions can be, from the point of view of the perceiving sub-
ject, indiscriminable from veridical perceptions. His mode of accounting 
for this fact turns on the idea that the philosopher of perception ought to 
start with the case of veridical perception, working out from there to an 
understanding of the case of non-veridical perception through an anal-
ysis of the manner in which it falls short of or is an otherwise defective 
instance of a properly veridical perception. This leads him to a philo-
sophically less committal conception of an apparent perception than 
the one a traditional epistemologist employs, in which an apparent per-
ception is conceived of (not as a genus which includes both veridical and 
non-veridical perceptions as its species, but rather) as a deficient mode 
of perception. Let us call this disjunctivist concept of an apparent per-
ception a merely apparent perception, and define it as follows: 
MAP A merely apparent perception is a perception which is in fact not ve-
ridical, but which turns out, as a further matter of fact, for a given subject in 
a given circumstance, to be indistinguishable from a veridical perception. 
Whereas the notion of a TAP is sufficiently philosophically committal 
so as to be one the disjunctivist is obliged to reject, the notion of a 
MAP is sufficiently philosophically non-committal so as to be one 
which both a conjunctivist and a disjunctivist can happily employ; 
they will, however, give very different analyses of what is involved in 
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such cases of merely apparent perception. (A conjunctivist will insist on 
employing the notion of a TAP to spell out what is involved in the case 
of a MAP.) To see how the disjunctivist analysis differs radically from the 
conjunctivist one, it will help first to introduce a further notion-name-
ly that of the genus which subsumes both deficient and non-deficient 
modes of perception as its species. I will call this an ostensible perception: 
OP An ostensible perception of <p is either a veridical perception of <p or a 
merely apparent perception of <p. 
The notion of an OP provides us with a different model for how to ac-
commodate the truth of IND. With OP in hand, nothing forces us to 
define a MAP in terms of a TAP. It is open to us to analyze the notion 
of a MAP in such a way that it can be made to depend essentially on the 
notion of a veridical perception (for example, if we take a MAP to be a 
defective case of veridical perception). Indeed, the disjunctivist will 
want to urge a stronger claim here: namely, that we cannot correctly 
account for the truth of IND without properly appreciating the asym-
metry between the two disjuncts here, and acknowledging the priority 
of the veridical over the non-veridical case. Consequently, from the dis-
junctivist point of view, the notion of a TAP builds too much into its 
description of what is involved in the case of a MAP. 
TAP and OP are equally attempts to introduce a comparatively in-
clusive concept of an apparent perception-that is, a concept of an ap-
parent perception which is able to encompass both cases of veridical 
perception and non-veridical perception as its instances. TAP and OP 
involve different ways of spelling out what the two cases 'have in com-
mon'. A TAP is supposed to be a sort of experience which is a common 
factor between a veridical and a non-veridical perception; whereas an 
OP is not an experience which is a common factor, but rather a concept 
of what two specifically different instances of a concept have generically 
1n common. 
For many philosophers, conjunctivism has seemed compulsory. This 
is in part because, in their employment of the ordinary language expres-
sion 'apparent perception', traditional epistemologists have tended to 
equivocate between the three different ways of understanding what an 
apparent perception is encapsulated in TAP, MAP, and OP respectively. 
Part of the interest of disjunctivism lies in the mere observation that 
once we clearly disambiguate these three different ways of understand-
ing what is at issue in a case of apparent perception, conjunctivism is no 
longer compulsory. Once we come to see that disjunctivism itself is an 
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option, then the conjunctivist, in order to defend the intelligibility of his 
project of solving TEE, will now be obliged to show that the bare con-
cept of a MAP itself must be analyzed in terms of a TAP. Since we are 
now faced with two possible ways of accounting for a MAP, either in 
terms of a TAP or an OP, the traditional epistemologist is no longer 
able simply to slide from the philosophically non-committal notion of 
a MAP to the philosophically committal notion of a TAP with no fur-
ther argument. The ambition of the disjunctivist, however, is not mere-
ly to shift the burden from himself (about how to analyze the concept of 
an apparent perception) back onto the traditional epistemologist, but 
rather to show that the traditional epistemologist's analysis of that con-
cept, in effect, concedes to the epistemological sceptic that which he 
most desires-namely that our perception always falls short of taking 
in what in the case. The disjunctivist therefore is concerned to mount 
an argument (as we shall see) to the effect that we will never arrive at 
a satisfactory account of veridical perception-one which allows us to 
maintain the idea that in virtue of perception we can come to know 
the world around us-if we insist on a conjunctivist schema for analyz-
ing what is involved in a veridical perception. 
So, on this account of what is generically constitutive of disjuncti-
vism, what different species of disjunctivist will all share is the idea 
that we will not be able to arrive at a satisfactory account of veridical 
perception if we insist upon analyzing that which a veridical and a 
non-veridical perception 'have in common' in terms of the concept 
of a TAP. This leaves room for different sorts of disjunctivist to offer 
differing accounts of what veridical and non-veridical perceptions do 
'have in common', while all equally eschewing a form of analysis in 
terms of a common experiential constituent. This is precisely the ques-
tion over which the two disjunctivists I consider in this paper differ. 
However, before we are in a position to see precisely how Martin 
and McDowell differ in this regard, first we need to uncover a further 
layer of difference between them-one which arises in their more spe-
cific reasons for holding that the conjunctivist will never be able to ar-
rive at a satisfactory account of the fact that veridical perception allows 
us to come to know about the world. 
In the next section, §3, I will explore Martin's disjunctivist critique 
of the traditional epistemologist. In the following section, §4, I will 
highlight some respects in which McDowell's disjunctivist critique of 
the traditional epistemologist differs from that of Martin. Finally, in 
§5, we will be in a position to specify how Martin and McDowell differ 
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on the particular question of what it is that veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual experiences 'have in common', and thus to see why there is 
an important difference in the species of disjunctivism they respectively 
advocate. 
3. Martin's Disjunctivism 
For Martin, disjunctivism arises as a result of an attempt to defend what 
he calls 'Naive Realism'. What is Naive Realism? One might have 
thought that a maximally philosophically non-committal way of speci-
fying what Naive Realism in the philosophy of perception comes to 
would be something like the following: "Perceiving is a way of know-
ing the world". Or perhaps: "Perception discloses what is the case". 
Martin's ways of specifying what Naive Realism comes to tend to be 
terminologically more heavy-handed. At one point, he tells us that 
Naive Realism is the claim that "veridical perception is a relation of 
awareness to mind-independent objects".7 On the face of it, even this 
formulation might still seem to be fairly innocuous-so much so that 
one might plausibly take it as a constraint on any philosophy of percep-
tion that it be able to endorse a claim which can be expressed using this 
form of words. As he goes on, however, Martin tends to further burden 
his specifications of that to which the Naive Realist is committed, so 
that they come to feel less and less naive. Thus, for example, Martin 
takes the formula to be amenable to the following gloss: 
So-Called Naive Realism "That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or 
events, the naive realist supposes that some such episodes have as constitu-
ents mind-independent objects."8 
This gloss ought to strike one as a little stronger than that which it gloss-
es, and when I use 'So-Called Naive Realism' in this paper I will intend 
it in this stronger way. The crucial point for the moment is simply that 
Martin takes achieving clarity about that to which the Naive Realist is 
committed to be the proper starting point for a disjunctivist line of 
thought. 9 
7 Martin (2006), 357. 
8 Ibid. 
9 It is worth noting that already here we encounter a significant difference be-
tween Martin and McDowell: namely in their respective accounts of what 
the philosophical starting point for a disjunctivist line of thought ought to 
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Martin takes So-Called Naive Realism to express the thesis that best 
describes our pre-reflective common-sense attitude towards perception; 
and he thinks, therefore, that we should abandon this thesis only if we 
are forced to by a compelling argument. Furthermore, Martin thinks 
that unless we can defend So-Called Naive Realism, we will find our-
selves in a position where we lack knowledge of the empirical world 
"because we lack the kind of perceptual access to it we supposed our-
selves to have" .1° For these allied reasons, Martin thinks that we should 
do what we can to defend So-Called Naive Realism. Martin thinks that 
a defence of So-Called Naive Realism will require us to adopt disjunc-
tivism. For that reason, let us provisionally suppose he is right that we 
should defend So-Called Naive Realism, and ask why he thinks it 
will require disjunctivism. 
As Martin summarizes things: "Disjunctivism . . . is reactive: it 
blocks a line of argument which would threaten to show we have no 
knowledge of the empirical world because we lack the kind of percep-
tual access to it we supposed ourselves to have" .11 The attack on Naive 
Realism which disjunctivism repels is what Martin calls the Argument 
From Hallucination. The Argument From Hallucination is, he writes, 
"best underst[ ood] ... as a form of reductio against Naive Realism" .12 
be. Martin starts by announcing that the aim of disjunctivism is to vindicate our 
entitlement to a particular epistemological thesis-one which he identifies with 
Naive Realism. Thus, for Martin, in order to understand what disjunctivism is, 
we first need an account of what Naive Realism is, what it commits us to, and 
what would be involved in defending it. Martin's aim is to argue for a philo-
sophical thesis which he takes to be true, and against one which he takes to 
be false. This is very different from McDowell's self-understanding. McDowell 
takes the task of disjunctivism to be to make perspicuous how any analysis of 
what is involved in an exercise of a perceptual capacity must allow it to 
come intelligibly into view as an exercise of a capacity. McDowell's criticism 
of the traditional epistemologist is that his analysis fails to do this. The criticism 
turns on the idea that (in the traditional epistemologist's account of the relation 
between a successful and an unsuccessful exercise of our perceptual capacity) he 
no longer operates with a coherent conception of a cognitive capacity. On this 
account, the problem with the traditional epistemological concept of an appa-
rent perception is that it is incoherent. Such a critique simply returns to us the 
idea that our perceptual capacity is a capacity which admits of successful and 
unsuccessful exercises. It is not meant to furnish a preliminary move toward 
a defence of some particular substansive philosophical thesis in epistemology. 
10 Martin (2006), 355. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 357. 
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In order to allow the crucial differences between Martin and McDowell 
which will concern us later to come into view, it will be helpful initially 
to summarize the overall shape of Martin's argument for disjunctivism 
in the following schematic manner: 
1. The Argument From Hallucination constitutes a reductio of So-
Called Naive Realism. 
2. Disjunctivism is the best way to avoid this reductio. 
3. We should defend So-Called Naive Realism because it represents 
our natural pre-theoretic conception of perception without which 
we would be forced to conclude that we lack knowledge of the em-
pirical world "because we lack the kind of perceptual access to it we 
supposed ourselves to have". 
4. By 2, disjunctivism is the best way to defend So-Called Naive Re-
alism. 
5. So, assuming that we want to hold onto the idea that we have 
knowledge of the empirical world, by 3 and 4, we should accept dis-
junctivism. 
3.1 First Objection and Response: Argument from Hallucination 
The aim of the present section is to assess the credentials of steps 1 and 2 
in the above argument. This requires addressing the following two 
questions: 'How does the Argument From Hallucination constitute a 
reductio against So-Called Naive Realism?', and, 'How does disjuncti-
vism thwart the Argument From Hallucination?' We'll address the first 
question first. 
The Argument From Hallucination, as Martin understands it, has 
two steps: 
1. one aimed at establishing what Martin calls the Common Kind As-
sumption, 
2. another aimed at showing that the Common Kind Assumption is in-
consistent with So-Called Naive Realism. 
The Common Kind Assumption is, for Martin, an assumption. His 
choice of terminology is designed to reflect his claim that there is no 
good argument for the Common Kind Assumption, and so the disjunc-
tivist can feel free to refuse to accept it. The Common Kind Assumption 
is Martin's way of formulating the conjunctivist claim that we must ac-
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count for IND by reference to the notion of a TAPY Recall (from §2) 
that all IND requires us to hold is that Smith, as a matter of fact, cannot 
distinguish between a sufficiently impressive hallucination of a lemon 
and a veridical perception of one. As we saw, the conjunctivist is 
moved on this basis to conclude that we need to postulate the existence 
of a TAP to account for that which a case of a veridical and a non-ve-
ridical perception 'have in common'. Rather than introduce something 
like our notion of a TAP, in his own account of the crucial misstep of 
the traditional epistemologist, Martin charges him instead with the error 
of postulating what he calls a 'Common Kind'. We could try to perhaps 
offer a provisional notion of a common kind as follows: 
Common Kind Although Smith is currently having a veridical perception of 
a lemon, she would be having just the same kind of experience were she 
hallucinating a lemon. 
Martin puts the conclusion that I have labelled 'Common Kind' this 
way: "whatever kind of mental, or more narrowly experiential, event 
occurs when one perceives, the very same kind of event could occur 
were one hallucinating". 14 With the Common Kind Assumption in 
hand, the second step in the Argument From Hallucination is to 
show that the Common Kind Assumption is inconsistent with So-
Called Naive Realism. Recall that according to So-Called Naive Real-
ism, "[t]aking experiences to be episodes or events, ... some such epi-
sodes have as constituents mind-independent objects" .15 The argument 
that we cannot hold both the Common Kind Assumption and So-
Called Naive Realism goes this way: suppose we "bring about a hallu-
cinatory experience through suitable manipulation ofbrain and mind".16 
By the Common Kind Assumption, whatever kind of mental or expe-
riential event occurs when one perceives also occurs in that hallucina-
tion. Since a hallucination does not constitutively involve a relation be-
tween a subject and a mind-independent object (it either involves are-
lation between the subject and a mind-dependent object, or no relation 
between the subject and an object at all) and hallucinations are the very 
13 See above, §2. 
14 Martin (2006), 357. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 358. That this is possible is a further assumption which I will not dispute. 
Martin guarantees it through what he calls Experiential Naturalism: "Our sense 
experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly 
physical and psychological causes" (Martin (2006), 357). 
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same kind of things as veridical perceptions, it follows that veridical per-
ceptions do not constitutively involve mind-independent objects. This 
contradicts So-Called Naive Realism. 
To see more clearly how Martin thinks this argument works, it helps 
to imagine a So-Called Naive Realist trying to argue that the Common 
Kind Assumption is not inconsistent with So-Called Naive Realism: 
According to the Common Kind Assumption, the kind of event that occurs 
when one has a veridical perception could occur were one instead to be 
having a hallucination: for example, whether she is having a veridical per-
ception or not, Smith is having an experience as of a lemon in front of her 
(she is also, in both cases, having an apparent perceptual experience, and, in 
both cases, having a Tuesday-apparent-perceptual experience, and so on). 
But if she were having a veridical perceptual experience of a lemon, her 
experience would be one of those kinds of experiences which has, as com-
ponent, a lemon (and thereby one of those kinds of experiences which has, 
as constituent, an external object). By contrast, if she were having a hallu-
cination, she would not be having an experience which falls under those 
kinds. 
To make sense of the Argument From Hallucination as Martin under-
stands it, the Common Kind Assumption needs to be understood against 
the background of a particular metaphysical presupposition: 
Kind Presupposition There is a most specific answer to the question 'What is 
it?' asked of Smith's veridical perception of a lemon, and this most specific 
answer is the fundamental kind of her veridical perception (call it K1). 
There is also a most specific kind to which an indistinguishable hallucina-
tion would belongs (call it K2) . 17 
With the Kind Presupposition in hand, Martin goes on to elaborate 
what he calls the Common Kind Assumption. It can be put this way: 
CKA The fundamental kind to which a veridical perceptual experience be-
longs is the same fundamental kind to which an indistinguishable apparent 
perception belongs; that is, K1=K2• 
Since the fundamental kind to which a mental episode belongs "tells us 
what essentially the event or episode is", we can see more clearly why 
Martin thinks the Common Kind Assumption is inconsistent with So-
17 Martin puts the Kind Presupposition this way: "[E]ntities (both objects and 
events) can be classified by species and genus; for all such entities there is a 
most specific answer to the question, 'What is it?' In relation to the mental, 
and to perception in particular, I will assume that for mental episodes or states 
there is a unique answer to this question which gives its most specific kind; it 
tells us what essentially the event or episode is" (Martin (2006), 361). 
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Called Naive Realism. The defender of the Common Kind Assumption 
can concede that there might well be kinds to which veridical percep-
tions belong but indistinguishable hallucinations do not. But if the 
Common Kind Assumption is correct, veridical perceptions and indis-
tingushable hallucinations belong to the same fundamental kind, and 
so share their essential features. Since it is not essential to a hallucination 
to involve a mind-independent object, it cannot be of the essence of a 
veridical perception to involve a mind-independent object. And this 
contradicts So-Called Naive Realism. 
It is also worth highlighting that for Martin, the Common Kind As-
sumption is the claim that a veridical perception and an indiscriminable 
hallucination belong to the same fundamental mental kind of event or 
episode. It is not a claim about the brain-state kinds which are involved 
in such experiences. Martin flags this with a further term-of-art: 'phe-
nomenal'. The Common Kind Assumption is a claim about the phe-
nomenal, rather than, say, the physiological, kind to which veridical 
perceptions and hallucination belong. 18 
What has emerged is the following: the Argument From Hallucina-
tion, according to Martin, will only have teeth against So-Called Naive 
Realism if we take the Common Kind Assumption to amount to the 
claim that veridical perceptions and indistinguishable hallucinations be-
long to the same fundamental phenomenal kind. 
Disjunctivism, according to Martin, blocks the Argument From 
Hallucination by adumbrating a conception of perception according 
to which the move from IND to CKA would be an error. It does so 
by insisting that "veridical perceptual experience is of a distinct kind 
from hallucination" 19, where, as we have seen, what this comes to is 
the following claim: veridical perceptual experience is of a distinct, fun-
damental, phenomenal kind from hallucination. So a disjunctivist, ac-
cording to Martin, claims: 
(I) No instance of the specific fundamental phenomenal kind of experience 
I have now, when seeing the white picket fence for what it is, could occur 
were I not to perceive such a mind-independent object as this. 20 
18 See, for example, Martin (2006), 367. 
19 Ibid., 354. 
20 Martin's actual formulation of this claim runs as follows: "No instance of the 
specific kind of experience I have now, when seeing the white picket fence 
for what it is, could occur were I not to perceive such a mind-independent ob-
ject as this" (Martin (2006), 357). This formulation, however, as it stands, is suf-
ficiently vague as to allow it to appear to coincide with something McDowell 
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Before we continue, it is worth noting that Martin's account not only 
satisfies the constraints on a generically disjunctivist view adumbrated 
in §2, namely by rejecting the traditional epistemologist's highly philo-
sophically committal way of analysing what it is that veridical and non-
veridical perceptions 'have in common' but he has offered his own al-
ternative account of this analysis which turns on our willingness to buy 
into a great deal of additional metaphysics regarding the differences be-
tween fundamental and non-fundamental kinds, their respective rela-
tions to essences, and between phenomenal and non-phenomenal 
kinds; so that it now appears that a successful argument against the tradi-
tional epistemologist turns on the proper deployment of all these addi-
tional notions. 
3.2 Second Objection and Response: The Explanation Objection 
We started from the fact that Martin thinks that in order to hold onto 
the idea that perception allows us to gain knowledge of the world, 
we will have to defend a conception of perception according to 
which veridical perceptions have as constituents mind-independent ob-
jects. He thinks that a defence of this claim will lead to a rejection of the 
Common Kind Assumption and an acceptance of (I). 
Since Martin is interested in defending So-Called Naive Realism 
from attack, he focuses on the objections which might be raised against 
it. So far we have seen him claim that in order to defend So-Called 
Naive Realism, we will not be able to accept any view according to 
which veridical perceptions and indistinguishable hallucinations are of 
fundamentally the same kind. This led Martin to formulate (I) as a cen-
tral claim of disjunctivism. But Martin thinks that there is a powerful 
variant of the Argument From Hallucination which also casts doubt 
on So-Called Naive Realism. I dub this further objection the Explana-
tion Objection. The stout disjunctivist defender of So-Called Naive 
Realism needs more than (I) to defeat the Explanation Objection. 
Once one begins to see how and why Martin feels the need to further 
strengthen disjunctivism in order to provide it with additional resources 
holds. It is only once we see that Martin is committed to an analysis of 'the 
common kind' here at issue in terms of kinds that are both fundamental and 
phenomenal in his sense that his divergence from McDowell can come into 
vrew. 
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for meeting the Explanation Objection, it becomes even more apparent 
how radically his disjunctivism differs from that of McDowell. For this 
reason, I will linger for a moment over the Explanation Objection and 
the materials Martin furnishes the disjunctivist to respond to it. 
Remember that, according to Martin, the Argument From Halluci-
nation causes trouble for So-Called Naive Realism in virtue of an appli-
cation of the Common Kind Assumption (CKA). To defend So-Called 
Naive Realism, Martin thinks the disjunctivist has to block CKA by ac-
cepting (I). The Explanation Objection causes trouble for So-Called 
Naive Realism by working with a variant of CKA which concedes 
(I). I'm going to give this variant of CKA-whose ultimate aim is 
again to make trouble for So-Called Naive Realism-a name: CKA 
Redux. Recall that the problem with CKA was that it claimed that ve-
ridical perceptions and indistinguishable hallucinations were of essential-
ly the same kind-so veridical perceptions could not feature mind-inde-
pendent objects as essential constituents. CKA Redux concedes that ve-
ridical perceptions have mind-independent objects as essential constitu-
ents, but threatens to deprive this feature of veridical perceptions of any 
explanatory significance. That is, the proponent of CKA Redux insists 
that although veridical perceptions and indistinguishable hallucinations 
belong to different most specific kinds, they both belong to a less spe-
cific common kind. And it is this common, less-specific kind which 
does all the explaining. The proponent of CKA Redux issues a challenge 
to the So-Called Naive Realist: 
Take some fact the explanation of which you think involves So-Called 
Naive Realist veridical perceptions. I'll show you that the explanation 
would be just as good if, instead of appealing to veridical perceptions, 
we appealed to that kind to which an indistinguishable hallucination 
would belong. So, to the extent that we are concerned with generating ad-
equate explanations, there is no need to invoke veridical perceptions, un-
derstood as the So-Called Naive Realist wishes to do. 
It might help to lay this argument out step-by-step. We'll start with: 
CKA Redux Although Smith's veridical perception of a lemon belongs to a 
different most specific phenomenal kind than would an indistinguishable 
hallucination, nevertheless there is a less specific phenomenal kind (i) to 
which the veridical perception belongs, and (ii) to which the hallucination 
(were she to be having it instead) would belong. 
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The Explanation Objection starts with CKA Redux, which is consistent 
with (I). 21 Let us introduce another kind of experience that Smith might 
have-a SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING. This kind is supposed to meet the 
characterization introduced in CKA Redux: Smith's hallucination of 
a lemon is of fundamental kind SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING, and her verid-
ical perception of a lemon is also of this kind. 22 To see how the objec-
tion proceeds, imagine the following two scenarios: 
Situation 1 Sitting in a London pub, Smith has a veridical perception of a 
lemon-an experience of fundamental kind LEMON-SEEING. By So-Called 
Naive Realism, the lemon she sees is a constituent of her experience. It is 
summer, and seeing the lemon awakens in her a craving for a gin and tonic, 
so she orders one. 
Situation 2 Sitting in a London pub, Smith has a hallucination of a lemon, 
indistinguishable from a veridical perception of a lemon. Her experience is 
of fundamental kind SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING, a kind different (by (I)) from 
LEMON-SEEING. It is summer, and apparently seeing the lemon awakens in 
her a craving for a gin and tonic, so she orders one. 
According to the Explanation Objection, if the disjunctivist admits the 
existence of the kind SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING which (a) embraces both 
veridical perceptions of lemons and lemon hallucinations and (b) ex-
plains Smith's behaviour, then the disjunctivist will have thereby 
"made the kind of episode which is unique to the perceptual situation 
redundant in an account of consciousness and the mind".23 We could 
dub this conclusion: 
Explanatory Redundancy Even if there were So-Called Naive Realist verid-
ical perceptions, they would be explanatorily redundant in an account of 
consciousness and mind. 
The argument goes this way: 
21 I'm not here going to rehearse Martin's reconstruction of an argument for CKA 
Redux (Martin (2003), 53£), for our purposes it'll do merely to observe that (I) 
is consistent with CKA Redux. 
22 We'll have to think of a SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING as different from an OP. From 
Martin's point of view, the notion of an OP is formed by disjoining two kinds, 
and thus does not give the most specific answer to a 'What is it?' question. A 
SEEMING-LEMON-SEEING is supposed to give the fundamental answer to the 
question: 'What is it?' asked of a lemon hallucination, although not the most 
specific answer to this question asked of a veridical perception of a lemon 
(see fu. 9). 
23 Martin (2003), 61. 
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1. In both Situation 1 and Situation 2, we take Smith's action of ordering 
the G&T to be a "causal (and possibly rational)" consequence of the 
experience she has had.24 
2. In Situation 2, the explanation of Smith's ordering-behaviour will de-
rive from an appeal to the kind of experience she had-a Seeming-
Lemon-Seeing. 25 
3. By CKA Redux, the kind of event Seeming-Lemon-Seeing also oc-
curs in Situation 1 (as does the kind Lemon-Seeing). 
4. Since the drink-ordering-behaviour is the same in Situations 1 and 2, 
and Smith's having an experience of the kind Seeming-Lemon-Seein-
g explains her ordering-behaviour in Situation 2, and that very same 
kind of event occurs in Situation 1, it is natural to conclude that 
what explains her ordering-behaviour in Situation 1 must also be the 
fact that she is having an experience of kind Seeming-Lemon-Seeing.26 
5. So the fact that Smith has a veridical perception of a lemon in Situation 
1 is redundant in an explanation of her behaviour in that situation. 27 
Martin notes that this argument is not deductive-the conclusion is sim-
ply that it is far more natural to think that what does the explaining is the 
kind common to veridical perceptions and hallucinations. But Martin 
thinks that the onus is squarely on the disjunctivist to show why we 
should not conclude Explanatory Redundancy. That is, the disjunctivist 
who wants to admit CKA Redux must say something to defend his 
claim that "there is a distinctive role for only veridical perceptual expe-
riences to play". 28 Martin puts the challenge for the disjunctivist this 
way: "[W]hat shows that what is relevant to the explanations we 
24 Hallucinations and perceptions alike are "liable to coerce our beliefs and move 
us to action" and naturally enough we take these beliefs and actions to be "caus-
al (and possibly rational) consequences" of those experiences (Martin (2003), 
61). 
25 "[I)n the case of hallucination, to the extent that these phenomena do have any 
explanation, that explanation will derive from appeal to the kind of experience 
that the subject is then having" (Martin (2003), 61). 
26 "The phenomena which are in common between the hallucination and the 
perception are accompanied by a common kind of occurrence in both situa-
tions. So, the objector suggests, those phenomena will have a common explan-
ation in the two situations, namely the occurrence of a kind of experience com-
mon to both perception and hallucination", "the common kind of event be-
tween hallucination and perception seems better correlated with these common 
phenomena than the kind of event unique to perception and so seems to screen 
off the purely perceptual kind of event from giving us an explanation" (Martin 
(2003), 61 f). 
27 "[A)nd the kind of event which is unique to perceptual situations will be ex-
planatorily redundant" (Martin (2003), 62). 
28 Martin (2003), 63. 
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want to give is ever the kind of event peculiar to veridical perception 
rather than what is common to veridical perception and causally match-
ing hallucination ?"29 
Martin thinks that the only satisfactory way to block the Explanation 
Objection is to deny CKA Redux and to insist that there is never a non-
trivial kind to which both veridical perceptions and indiscriminable hal-
lucinations belong. 30 Thus he generates: 
(III) For certain visual experiences as of a white picket fence, namely cau-
sally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character 
of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding 
visual perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is. 31 
29 Martin (2006), 369. 
30 The argument that this is the only satisfactory response here is somewhat del-
icate. If the Explanation Objection is correct, then any reasonably 'positive' 
characterization of hallucinations will run foul of the objection. But clearly a 
veridical perception of a lemon and an indiscriminable hallucination of that 
lemon both belong to the kind INDISCRIMINABLE FROM A VERIDICAL PERCEP-
TION OF A LEMON. Furthermore, hallucinations sometimes have "causal (and 
possibly rational)" consequences, and so there are sometimes explanations we 
need to give which will involve an appeal to hallucinations (as, for example, 
in our Situation Two). Martin thinks that membership of this kind (INDISCRIM-
INABLE FROM A VERIDICAL PERCEPTION OF A LEMON) will be enough to make 
such explanations work (so it is in virtue of having an experience of the kind 
INDISCRIMINABLE FROM A VERIDICAL PERCEPTION OF A LEMON that Smith or-
dered a gin and tonic in Situation Two). But the fact that both veridical per-
ceptions and indistinguishable hallucinations are members of this common 
kind does not, Martin argues, allow us to run the Explanation Objection. Es-
sentially, this is because what makes the explanations involving hallucinations 
work is that these explanations are parasitic on the explanations which involve 
veridical perceptions (so an explanation of Smith's behaviour in Situation One 
must make appeal to her veridical perceptual experience, and the explanation of 
her behaviour in Situation Two is only adequate in virtue of the goodness of 
the explanation of her behaviour in Situation One). That is, although we can 
explain her behaviour in Situation Two by appealing to the fact that her expe-
rience is of kind INDISCRIMINABLE FROM A VERIDICAL PERCEPTION OF A LEMON, 
this is only because we have to explain her behaviour in Situation One by ap-
pealing to the fact that her experience is of the kind VERIDICAL PERCEPTION OF A 
LEMON. See Martin (2006), 67-70. 
31 Martin (2006), 369. I have termed (I) and (III) '(I)' and '(III)' respectively be-
cause Martin does. The progression of his argument from (I) to (III) goes via 
thesis (II). Both the details of this progression and of the intermediary thesis 
need not concern us here. In order not to needlessly exercise the reader's curi-
osity, here it is: "(II) The notion of a visual experience of a white picket fence is 
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(III) stakes out a bold metaphysical claim about the nature of and the 
relationship between veridical perceptions and hallucinations. If Martin 
is right, all disjunctivists will need to defend the view that we can say 
nothing more to characterize hallucinations than to say that they are in-
discriminable from veridical perceptions. This might seem like a difficult 
task, and disjunctivism has come under attack precisely because (III) has 
seemed to many not to leave us with sufficient resources for a satisfac-
tory account of the relationship between veridical and non-veridical 
perceptions. 
But is Martin right that in order to defend So-Called Naive Real-
ism, we will ultimately have to accept (III)? In particular, is defending 
(III) the only way that a disjunctivist could hold onto the idea that 
"there is a distinctive role for only veridical perceptual experiences to 
play"? I'll argue below that McDowell's is a disjunctivism which does 
allow us to insist that there is a distinctive role for only veridical percep-
tions to play without needing our to defend (III) or, for that matter, 
without our needing to commit ourselves to numerous collateral phil-
osophical theses regarding the metaphysics of kinds (of the sort 
which, according to Martin, are required for the defence of disjuncti-
vism). 
It is worth looking back on the territory we have just travelled. Dis-
junctivism, as it was first introduced in the generic characterization I of-
fered in §2, originally looked to be a position that charges the traditional 
epistemologist with a philosophically overly-committal conception of 
what is required to make sense of the idea that veridical perceptions 
and non-veridical perceptions 'have something in common'. Martin en-
ters the scene as someone who purports to strengthen the credentials of 
disjunctivism. We have now seen that his way of purporting to do this 
places a considerable burden on the disjunctivist. Rather than merely 
shifting the burden onto the conjunctivist and querying whether he 
has left us with a satisfactory account of our perceptual capacities, ac-
cording to Martin's choreography of the dialectic between the conjunc-
tivist and the disjunctivist, the disjunctivist must discharge two formida-
ble philosophical obligations before he is in any position to really rebut 
the conjunctivist: (1) to adumbrate and defend his own metaphysics of 
phenomenal kinds, and, (2) to use this metaphysics of phenomenal kinds 
to articulate thesis (111)-his own substantive metaphysical account of 
that of a situation being indiscrirninable through reflection from a veridical vis-
ual perception of a white picket fence as what it is" (Martin (2006), 363). 
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that which veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences 'have in 
common'. Much of the current philosophical literature on disjunctivism 
has now become sidetracked and bogged down in the debate about the 
prospects for mounting a defence of a version of (III). Prima facie, if 
there is an alternative sort of disjunctivism on offer which does not re-
quire of the disjunctivist that he first discharge these two prior dialectical 
obligations, it would seem to represent the cleaner and preferable phil-
osophical option. Moreover, if there is such a variety of disjunctivism on 
offer, then Martin's representation of the dialectic involves, in effect, a 
hijacking of the debate. In what follows, I will argue that McDowell's 
disjunctivism is of the cleaner and preferable variety, and that it has been 
hijacked. 
4. McDowell's Disjunctivism 
We have just seen that Martin constructs an argument for disjunctivism 
which concludes by insisting that there can be no non-trivial common 
kind to which both veridical perceptions and indistinguishable halluci-
nations belong. McDowell-! contend-disagrees with Martin on pre-
cisely this point; indeed, according to McDowell, we will not be enti-
tled to the idea that in a veridical perception a state of affairs makes itself 
manifest to the subject unless we admit that there can be a non-trivial 
account of that which veridical perceptions and indistinguishable hallu-
cination 'have in common'. We won't see clearly why this is until §5.2. 
The task of the present section is to outline McDowell's considerably 
less baroque argument for disjunctivism. 
McDowell puts the basic claim of disjunctivism this way: 
[P]erceptual appearances are either objective states of affairs making them-
selves manifest to subjects, or situations in which it is as if an objective state 
of affairs is making itself manifest to a subject, although that is not how 
things are. 32 
In McDowell's terminology, the position opposed to disjunctivism is 
the highest common factor view, which instead maintains that what it is 
to be a perceptual appearance is to be whatever it is that is the highest 
common factor between a veridical perceptual experience and an indis-
32 McDowell (2008b), 231. Cp. OP in §2. 
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tinguishable hallucination. 33 Recall that in §2 we noticed that it is nat-
ural to want to introduce some idea or other of an 'apparent perception' 
to account for IND. We went on, however, to distinguish three differ-
ent ways to define an 'apparent perception': a TAP, a MAP, and an OP. 
What McDowell calls a 'highest common factor' is what I have called a 
TAP in §2: it is a term meant to capture in as uncomplicated a way as 
possible what is philosophically suspect in the traditional epistemolo-
gist's concept of an apparent perception. Any excessive complication in-
troduced at this point in the characterization of that concept threatens to 
distract us from what is hopeless about philosophical attempts to solve 
the TEE. McDowell himself employs the terminology of 'perceptual 
appearance' in an artfully equivocal fashion: sometimes to mean a 
TAP, and sometimes to mean an OP. McDowell's point is that all a 
philosophically unprejudiced account of the datum of IND can entitle 
us to employ is 'perceptual appearanceOP' and that 'perceptual appear-
anceTAP, is both insufficiently motivated and epistemologically disas-
trous. 
For McDowell, disjunctivism allows us to see our way to a satisfac-
tory conception of what it is to know something on the basis of percep-
tion. The key idea here is that the concept of perception is a concept of 
a way of knowing-that is, a concept of a cognitive capacity. The prob-
lem with conjunctivism according to McDowell is that it ends up ren-
dering this truistic thought unintelligible. The aim of McDowell's dis-
junctivism is to restore to us our grip on this truism. This contrasts stark-
ly with the aim of Martin's disjunctivism, which is to convince us that a 
vindication of the thesis of Naive Realism requires a sort of philosoph-
ical heavy lifting via an account of the metaphysics of kinds and a de-
fence of claim (III). 
McDowell does say some things that can sound like things that Mar-
tin says. For example, McDowell suggests that a satisfactory account of 
what it is to come to know something on the basis of perception will 
require us to be able to hold onto the idea that in perception "we 
33 Martin thinks that what McDowell calls the highest common factor conception 
of a perceptual appearance is just the claim that a veridical perception and an 
indistinguishable hallucination belong to the same fundamental phenomenal 
kind (i.e., the Common Kind Assumption (as defined in §3.1)). Martin claims 
this equivalence explicitly at his Martin (2006), 357. It should, however, already 
be clear that Martin's CKA involves a different and more elaborate analysis of 
the notion than that provided above in our gloss of what is involved in an ap-
parent perception being a TAP. 
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can have environmental facts directly available to us". 34 This can sound a 
lot like one of Martin's less philosophically burdened formulations of 
Naive Realism: "veridical perception is a relation of awareness to 
mind-independent objects". It is not part of my point to argue that 
McDowell would necessarily be concerned to disown such a form of 
words, nor to deny that his broader philosophical project is meant to 
allow us to maintain a conception of perception that is consistent 
with what that form of words might be taken to say on a sufficiently 
philosophically innocuous construal of it. But it is crucial for me to 
deny that McDowell and Martin agree on the question of how much 
is required of the philosopher in order to be able to restore our hold 
on the bare idea that in perception "we can have environmental facts 
directly available to us". 
Although both Martin and McDowell think that the chief benefit of 
disjunctivism is to allow us to defend a satisfactory conception of what it 
is to know something on the basis of perception, they differ in their re-
spective accounts of the relationship between disjunctivism and Carte-
sian scepticism. On McDowell's account, the relationship between 
them is considerably more intimate than on Martin's. 35 For McDowell, 
disjunctivism simply amounts to the denial of what I have called con-
junctivism above, where conjunctivism, on his account, is to be seen 
as immediately committing us to a Cartesian conception of the 
mind-that is, a conception of the mind according to which any exer-
cise of our perceptual capacities necessarily falls short of achieving cog-
nitive contact with the state of affairs which such an exercise purports to 
put us in touch with. For McDowell, conjunctivism therefore threatens 
to force us to conclude that we cannot come to know anything on the 
b . f . 36 as1s o percept10n. 
34 McDowell (2008b), 229. 
35 Martin does think that disjunctivism is in tension with Cartesian scepticism, but 
the tension is one of some kind of intellectual aporia. See Martin (2006), §10. 
36 Notice that for McDowell, it is the conjunctivist claim about what veridical 
perceptions are which threatens to deprive us of the idea that we can know 
about the world on the basis of perception; and it will only be by finding an 
altemative account of the nature of veridical perception that we can restore 
this 'epistemological' truism. So this epistemological truism is neither the 
only claim of McDowell's disjunctivism (although vindicating the epistemolog-
ical truism is part of what motivates it), nor does it separate McDowell from 
Martin - since, as we've seen, Martin too is concerned to vindicate some ver-
sion of the same epistemological truism. 
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4.1 McDowell's Disjunctivism and the Cartesian Sceptic 
McDowell's basic strategy is to argue as follows: 
1. Traditional epistemology relies on the highest common factor con-
ception of a perceptual appearance (or, a TAP), 
2. This forces on us a conjunctivist (i.e. a Cartesian) account of what is 
involved in veridical perception, leaving us with the task of having 
to solve the TEE, 
3. Solving the TEE in a way that preserves the idea that veridical per-
ception allows us to know about the world is doomed to failure, 
4. The disjunctivist schema (OP) shows that we need not adopt the 
highest common factor conception of experience, 
5. Therefore, we can reject the task of solving the TEE and thus need 
not be troubled by Cartesian scepticism. 
Notice how very different is the role which disjunctivism plays in the 
above argument against the traditional epistemologist from the role it 
plays in Martin's argument for Naive Realism. This difference between 
them becomes invisible if we attempt to reduce disjunctivism to a two 
sentence statement of a 'philosophical position'. At the latter level of de-
scription, it is extremely difficult to see how different Martin's and 
McDowell's approaches to their shared topic really are from each 
other. What we need to appreciate, in order to see this, is the very dif-
ferent dialectical contexts in which their respective employments of the 
disjunctivist schema of §2 are embedded. This difference amounts, in a 
significant sense, to a difference in what disjunctivism is for each of 
them. 
For McDowell, Cartesian scepticism is the inevitable result of ana-
lyzing what a veridical and a non-veridical perception 'have in com-
mon' in terms of a TAP-that is, Cartesian scepticism is, essentially, a 
way of drawing attention to the impossibility of solving TEE. We can 
better appreciate the role that disjunctivism plays in McDowell's philos-
ophy by seeing why this is the case. 
The Cartesian sceptical argument, according to McDowell asks us to 
"Consider a situation in which a subject seems to see that, say, there is a 
red cube in front of her. The idea is that even if we focus on the best 
possible case, her experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if 
there were no red cube in front of her". 37 He comments that 
37 McDowell (2008b), 228. 
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The familiar sceptical scenarios-Descartes's demon, the scientist with our 
brains in his vat, the suggestion that all our apparent experience might be a 
dream-are only ways to make this supposed predicament vivid.38 
The next step in the Cartesian sceptical argument-as reconstructed by 
McDowell-is to conclude from this observation that we never have a 
better reason to believe that things are as experience presents them to be 
than we would have in the case of a hallucination. 
So on McDowell's reconstruction, the standard Cartesian sceptical 
argument has two steps: 
1. To 'make vivid' the predicament posed by highest common factor 
conception of apparent perception; 
2. To draw from this predicament the conclusion that we never have 
good reason to believe that the external world is as our perceptions 
seem to reveal it to be. 
Let us grant, for a moment, that McDowell is right about 1, that is, that 
the Cartesian sceptic must begin by presupposing the highest common 
factor conception of perception. What about 2? That is, how does the 
sceptical conclusion follow from the highest common factor conception 
of apparent perception? Recall that, according to the highest common 
factor conception, not only must we hold that a veridical and a non-ve-
ridical perceptual experience 'have something in common', but we must 
analyze that which they 'have in common' literally in terms of their 
having some thing in common, that is, in terms of the concept of a 
TAP. So, if that highest common factor conception is correct, then 
there is nothing about perceptual experience considered as such to pro-
vide me with more than inconclusive reasons for thinking that the ex-
ternal world is a certain way. This is because my perceptual experience 
would be, as such, exactly the same even if the external world were not 
as my experience seems to reveal it to be. The best epistemic standing 
which we can achieve in virtue of our perceptual experience is not 
yet enough to licence any beliefs about the external world. 
If 2 is right, what of 1? Is it really the case that the Cartesian sceptic 
must start by, in essence, insisting on the highest common factor con-
ception of apparant perception? At first glance, it seems quite plausible 
to think that McDowell is just wrong about this-surely the familiar 
Cartesian sceptical arguments don't require anything so strong as a 
38 Ibid. 
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claim about the nature of experience ?39 We might try to defend a read-
ing of Cartesian scepticism which does not presuppose the highest com-
mon factor conception of apparent perception this way: 
The sceptic urges that Smith cannot tell, by mere reflection on her expe-
rience, whether she is in the good case or a bad case. For all she knows, she 
might always be in a bad case. So really, she should not have any confi-
dence that she knows any of the things she takes herself to have come to 
know through perceptual experience. But this reconstruction of the scep-
tical argument does not depend on the highest common factor conception 
of apparent perception. Indeed, the sceptic, as far as I can see, could con-
cede disjunctivism and thereby acknowledge that the good cases are con-
stitutively linked to the states of the world they represent, and the bad 
cases aren't. The sceptical point is merely that Smith can never be sure 
which case she is in, and so she shouldn't be confident that she knows any-
thing on the basis of perception. 
Let us give this kind of Cartesian sceptic-the sceptic who concedes dis-
junctivism (and denies the highest common factor conception of expe-
rience) but still attempts to run a sceptical argument-a name. Call him 
a weak Cartesian sceptic. And let us call the kind of sceptic McDowell is 
interested in-the kind who relies on the highest common factor con-
ception of apparent perception-a strong Cartesian sceptic. McDowell's 
claim is, in effect, that the Catesian sceptical argument is only interesting 
in so far as it is a version of strong Cartesian scepticism. We need not 
bother with the weak Cartesian sceptic. But why? 
To see why McDowell dismisses weak Cartesian scepticism, we 
need a further premise. McDowell thinks that if we adopt the disjunc-
tive conception of experience, we will thereby have admitted the intel-
ligibility of the following: that some perceptual experiences, considered 
as such, are cases of an objective state of affairs making itself manifest to a 
subject. But to admit this, thinks McDowell, is to acknowledge that the 
epistemic standing of an agent in the good case is different from the 
epistemic standing of an agent in the bad case. That is, suppose we ac-
knowledge the conceivability of a perceptual experience in which an 
objective state of affairs makes itself manifest to a subject, where this 
is a different kind of perceptual experience from those perceptual expe-
riences which merely seem to be cases of an objective state of affairs 
making itself manifest. McDowell thinks that the two cases correspond 
to two possible 'standings in the space of reasons'. Although in a suffi-
ciently vivid version of the bad case (in which she is having a non-ve-
39 Martin, for one, insists on this in his Martin (2006), §10. 
Motivating Disjunctivism 335 
ridical perceptual experience) Smith herself wouldn't know that she 
were having a non-veridical perceptual experience, in the good case 
(where her exercise of her perceptual capacities afford her a way of 
knowing) she is justified in believing that there is a lemon in front of 
her. The bad case, as specified in the preceding sentence, is too under-
described to determine what her degree of epistemic responsibility is in 
this failure to know. If she failed to exercise due care or otherwise un-
dermined her capacity to do so (e. g. by taking hallucinogenic mush-
rooms) then she is not blameless for coming to believe that things are 
as they perceptually seem to her to be. If she is a victim of bad epistemic 
luck (e. g. confronted with a compelling perceptual illusion) then she 
may be blameless for coming to believe that the world is as her percep-
tion presents it as being. Neither of these cases, however, impugn her 
claim to know when she is responsibly exercising her perceptual capaci-
ties under normal conditions. We can give the underlying idea here a 
name: 
Knowledge Premise When a perception constitutively involves an objective 
state of affairs making itself manifest to a subject, that subject has a different 
epistemic standing than in the case-potentially indiscriminable to the sub-
ject-when her perception does not constitutively involve an state of affairs 
making itself manifest. 
The Knowledge Premise has seemed contestable and has been contested 
by many. My point here is simply that the Knowledge Premise plays a 
crucial role in McDowell's case for his disjunctive conclusion, but is not 
to be identified with the conclusion itself 
A proper understanding of what McDowell takes to be involved in 
committing oneself to the Knowledge Premise should reveal, however, 
that it is simply a further condition on one's being able to retain one's 
grip on the idea that perception is a capacity to come to know about the 
world, since any adequate account of a capacity will involves a certain 
form of asymmetry in how successful and unsuccessful exercises of the 
capacity are related to one another. That is, if we are to retain the 
idea that perception is a capacity to come to know about the world, 
then we have to acknowledge that it "is a capacity-of course falli-
ble-to get into positions in which one has indefeasible warrant forcer-
tain beliefs". 40 This is because, McDowell claims, it simply makes no 
sense to (a) maintain that perception is a capacity to know about the 
40 McDowell (2010), 245 (in this volume, 293). 
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world and (b) deny that in "non-defective exercises"41 of that capacity 
we can have indefeasible warrants for certain beliefs. McDowell defends 
this claim by contrasting a view which maintains (a) and (b) about our 
perceptual capacities with a parallel claim about another capacity: 
"Some people have a capacity to throw a basketball through the hoop 
from the free-throw line". 42 To hold both (a) and (b) would be tanta-
mount to thinking that "there cannot be a capacity-of course not guar-
anteed success on all occasions-in whose non-defective exercises one 
actually makes free throws". 43 
I introduced the Knowledge Premise as part of an attempt to explain 
why McDowell thinks we can dismiss weak Cartesian scepticism. Sup-
pose we grant McDowell the Knowledge Premise. How can he now 
respond to weak Cartesian scepticism? We can think of the response 
as itself having two steps. First, with the Knowledge Premise in hand, 
McDowell can point out that in the good case-since the good case 
is simply a case of the world presenting itself to Smith as it is-Smith 
is entitled to her knowledge claim. 
If the animal in front of me is a zebra, and conditions are suitable for ex-
ercising my ability to recognize zebras when I see them (for instance, the 
animal is in full view), then that ability, fallible though it is, enables me 
to see that it is a zebra, and to know that I do. 44 
To put it another way: weak Cartesian scepticism, in conceding disjunc-
tivism, concedes the intelligibility of the idea that Smith can be justified 
in believing that there is a lemon in front of her in virtue of having an 
experience which presents that lemon to her. 
So the first step in McDowell's response to weak Cartesian scepti-
cism is this: in conceding disjunctivism, the weak Cartesian sceptic con-
cedes that if Smith has a veridical perception of a lemon, then in virtue 
of the fact that that experience directly presents a lemon to her, she is 
justified in believing that there is a lemon there. The second step in 
McDowell's way with the weak Cartesian sceptic is this: Nothing the 
weak Cartesian sceptic has said forces us to give up the idea that most 
of the time I am justified in believing that things are thus and so in vir-
tue of the fact that I can open my eyes and see that things are thus and 
so. As McDowell puts it, if scepticism concedes disjunctivism, we can 
41 Ibid., 246 (in this volume, 293). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 McDowell (2008b), 239. 
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simply "appeal to ordinary cases of perceptual knowledge in ruling out 
the sceptical scenarios". 45 
So McDowell's strategy here is this: we only need bother with a 
sceptical argument if the sceptic can put us in a position where we 
have to abandon something which commonsense tells us to be the 
case. If scepticism concedes disjunctivism, it thereby concedes the intel-
ligibility of Smith's being justified in believing that she sees a lemon in 
virtue of her seeing a lemon. And once this possibility is intelligible, 
then the sceptic no longer has the resources to force us to abandon 
our commonsense knowledge claims. Therefore, for McDowell, we 
are not compelled to engage with the sceptic. To put the point the 
other way around: if the sceptic can do no more than to draw attention 
to our fallibility, then there is no need to engage with him. We only 
need engage with the sceptic if he can force an engagement by present-
ing us with an argument which leaves us with no choice but to abandon 
the commonsense idea that I can know many things on the basis of per-
ception. The weak Cartesian sceptic cannot do this, but the strong Car-
tesian sceptic does: by relying on the notion of a TAP, he introduces a 
conception of perception according to which Smith's epistemic standing 
is identical in both good and bad cases. 
To summarize: the weak Cartesian sceptic admits that it is intelligi-
ble for there to be perceptual experiences which directly present the ex-
ternal world. In this case, McDowell urges that we need not feel com-
pelled to engage with scepticism. Weak Cartesian scepticism, in effect, 
does no more than draw attention to our fallibility, and we can instead 
rely on our common sense and rule out the sceptical scenarios. We only 
need engage with the sceptic if he can rationally compel an engagement 
by forcing us into a position where we can no longer rely on common 
sense. Cartesian scepticism is only compelling, argues McDowell, if it 
forces us to conclude that we never have a better epistemic warrant 
for believing the world to be as it seems than the warrant we would 
have were we the victims of a hallucination. And this can only be 
done by foisting on us the highest common factor conception of per-
ceptual appearances (that is, by insisting that we analyze what it is that 
a veridical and a non-veridical perception 'have in common' in terms 
ofa TAP). 
So far then, McDowell's claim is this: only strong Cartesian scepti-
cism forces us to abandon the idea that we can ever know that the world 
45 Ibid., 237. 
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is thus-and-so on the basis of perception. But it can do this only because 
it relies on the highest common factor conception of perceptual appear-
ances (that is, by insisting that we analyze a perception in terms of a 
TAP). Conversely, McDowell thinks that by accepting the traditional 
epistemologist's conception of an apparent perception, Cartesian scepti-
cism is the inevitable result: for veridical experience, as such, will never 
give us better warrant for believing the world to be thus-and-so than 
would an indistinguishable hallucination. Since (strong) Cartesian scep-
ticism is the inevitable result of accepting the analysis of an apparent per-
ception in terms of a TAP, the project of solving TEE is doomed to fail-
ure. If, instead, we acknowledge that it is so much as intelligible that 
some perceptions are cases of the world making itself manifest, then 
we need not be troubled by Cartesian scepticism, and we need not 
abandon the idea that we can come to know that the world is thus-
and-so on the basis of perception. It is precisely the intelligibility of 
this conception of experience which is brought into view by the dis-
junctivist. 
4.2 The Intelligibility of Disjunctivism 
For McDowell, Cartesian scepticism is an expression of what happens if 
we allow ourselves to be talked into analyzing what veridical and non-
veridical perceptions 'have in common' in terms of a TAP. In order to 
avoid the difficulties of Cartesian scepticism and TEE, we need to re-
move the key prop required by the Cartesian sceptic. According to 
McDowell, the key prop of Cartesian scepticism is accepting the tradi-
tional epistemologist's notion of a TAP. Disjunctivism knocks out this 
prop by guarantee the mere intelligibility of the idea of a perceptual ex-
perience in which the world makes itself manifest. And (still according 
to McDowell) the disjunctivist analysis of perceptual experience is, in 
turn, secured by something the Cartesian sceptic will not deny: that 
both veridical and non-veridical perceptions seem to present the 
world to be thus-and-so. The disjunctivist analysis is 'transcendentally' 
required in order to understand the very idea that experiences 'purport' 
to present the world as being a certain way. 
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McDowell claims to find an appropriate transcendental argument in 
Sellars. 46 Sellars starts with what he calls a "simple but fundamental" 47 
observation: 
the sense of 'red' in which things look red is, on the fact of it, the same as 
that in which things are red. When one glimpses an object and decides that 
it looks red (to me, now, from here) and wonders whether it really is red, 
one is surely wondering whether the color-red-which it looks to have 
is the one it really does have. 48 
That is, "being red is logically prior, is a logically simpler notion, than 
looking red"49 Sellars cashes this by saying that whilst "This necktie is 
green" has a straightforward reporting use, "This necktie looks green" 
is used when the speaker is reluctant to endorse the report which she 
would issue if she said "This necktie is green". On Sellars' account, 
'is green' is a straightforward report; but 'looks green' has both a 're-
porting' and an 'inferential' component.50 "[W]hen I say 'x looks 
green to me now' I am reporting the fact that my experience is, so to 
speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical 
one of seeing that x is green"51 but I use that locution because "I 
may have reason to think that x may not after all be green". 52 
So suppose Smith says sincerely 'x looks green to me'. Then either 
Smith sees that x is green and is unwilling to endorse that claim or 
Smith is having an experience which is, from her point of view, exacdy 
like the experience she would have if she were seeing that x is green, but 
46 This is how McDowell glosses Sellars: "In order to find it intelligible that ex-
perience has objective purport at all, we must be able to make sense of an epis-
temically distinguished class of experiences, those in which (staying with the 
visual case) one sees how things are--those in which how things are makes itself 
visually available to one" (McDowell (2008b), 230). 
47 Sellars (1997), §12. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 This claim arises as Sellars imagines how looks-talk might have come to be use-
ful to a community which lacks it. He puts the question this way: what is John 
the tie salesman (who has not yet learned looks-talk) to say when confronted 
with a tie under suboptimal lighting conditions? His (i.e. John's) natural re-
sponse is this: "I don't know what to say. if I didn't know that the tie is 
blue-and the alternative to granting this is odd indeed-! would swear that 
I was seeing a green tie and seeing that it is green. It is as though I were seeing 
the necktie to be green" (Sellars (1997), §14). 
51 Sellars (1997), §16. 
52 Ibid. 
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x isn't green, and Smith is unwilling to endorse the claim that xis green. 
McDowell summarizes the point thus: 
In order to understand the very idea of the objective purport of visual ex-
perience (to single out one sensory modality), we need to appreciate that 
the concept of experiences in which, say, it looks to one as if there is a 
red cube in front of one divides into the concept of cases in which one 
sees that there is a red cube in front of one and the concept of cases in 
which it merely looks to one as if there is a red cube in front of one. 53 
Thus, for McDowell, the basic claim of disjunctivism follows from a 
consideration of an idea that no party to the dispute denies: that verid-
ical and non-veridical perceptions alike seem to put us in contact with 
the world. 
5 The Incompatibility of Martin and McDowell 
In this section, I argue that the fundamental incompatibility between 
McDowell's disjunctivism and that of Martin is this: for McDowell, dis-
junctivism not only can, but must, leave open the possibility that there is 
a non-trivial account of that which veridical and non-veridical percep-
tions 'have in common'. Martin cannot admit the existence of such a 
non-trivial account. In the first subsection, I argue that Martin's form 
of disjunctivism is incompatible with any theory of perception accord-
ing to which perceptions themselves have content. In the second sub-
section, I argue that McDowell's disjunctivism is, and must be, compat-
ible with such views. 
5.1 Martin's Disjunctivism and the Content of Perception 
McDowell, we have seen, maintains that Cartesian scepticism threatens 
to render unintelligible something which seems commonplace: that on 
the basis of perceptions which reveal the world to be thus-and-so we 
can come to know that the world is thus-and-so. He claims that in 
order to disarm the Cartesian sceptic, it will be enough to show that 
the mere intelligibility of this commonplace is guaranteed by something 
that the Cartesian sceptic takes for granted: that veridical and non-verid-
ical perceptions alike seem to present the world to be a certain way. 
53 McDowell (2008b), 230. 
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Focussing on the idea that the Cartesian sceptic already admits that 
veridical and non-veridical perceptions alike both purport to present the 
world to be a certain way is, from Martin's point of view, dangerous. 
For Martin, it is critical that we do not embrace a conception of percep-
tion according to which perceptions themselves have any form of rep-
resentational content. There are various ways that philosophers have 
maintained that perceptions themselves have content. Suppose, for ex-
ample, we have a view according to which veridical perceptions draw on 
conceptual capacities. 54 Once we admit that a veridical perception draws 
on conceptual capacities, it becomes natural enough to say that an indis-
tinguishable hallucination draws on precisely the same conceptual ca-
pacities. That is, Smith's veridical perception of a lemon and her hallu-
cination of a lemon both somehow draw on her lemon concept. But to 
say that both Smith's veridical perception of a lemon and her hallucina-
tion of a lemon draw on her lemon concept is, from Martin's point of 
view, a significant enough characterization of what they 'have in com-
mon' to fall prey to the Explanation Objection. 
That is, experience which draws on Smith's concept lemon is a 'positive' 55 
characterization of a 'common kind' under which both Smith's veridical 
perception of a lemon and an indistinguishable hallucination she might 
have would fall. It is a positive enough common kind that it will be 
overwhelmingly natural to conclude that we must explain Smith's 
gin-and-tonic-ordering behaviour in both Situation One and Situation 
Two (above, §3.2) by appealing to the fact that her experience is of this 
kind-and so make her veridical perception of a lemon explanatorily re-
dundant. To admit that Smith's veridical perception of a lemon and her 
hallucination of a lemon both draw on her concept lemon is thus to fall 
foul of Martin's third tenet of disjunctivism: 'For certain visual experi-
ences as of a white picket fence, namely causally matching hallucina-
tions, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such experiences 
than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding visual percep-
tions of a white picket fence as what it is.'56 Martin's disjunctivist 
54 On such a view, veridical perceptions won't be full-blooded representations. 
This view is the one currently favoured by McDowell-although not much 
will turn on exactly how we formulate the point. 
55 See fu. 17 for this terminology. 
56 A Martinian disjunctivist might try to salvage the idea that veridical perceptions 
draw on conceptual capacities without admitting that there is a significant com-
mon kind shared by veridical perceptions and indiscriminable hallucinations. 
We might, for example, claim that although veridical perceptions draw on con-
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must insist that veridical and non-veridical perceptions 'have something 
in common' only in the most trivial sense. 57 
For this reason, those who have wanted to take Martin's form of dis-
junctivism seriously have insisted that there can be no sense in which 
either veridical perceptions or indiscriminable hallucinations draw on 
conceptual capacities at all: perceptions must themselves be totally 
non-conceptual. 58 Furthermore, Martin's disjunctivism has been criti-
cized precisely for this reason-because it does not allow us to maintain 
the idea that perceptions themselves have content. 59 Call this the objec-
tion from perceptual content. 60 In the next section, we'll see that 
McDowell's version of disjunctivism is not subject to this objection. 
5.2 McDowell's Disjunctivism and the Content of Perception 
McDowell's disjunctivism is, for all I have said so far, consistent with the 
claim that there might be a non-trivial way of characterizing what it is 
that a veridical perception and an indistinguishable hallucination 'have 
in common'. In this section, I want to urge that this is a crucial feature 
of McDowell's account. 
I've made the case that McDowell's disjunctivism emerges as part of 
his project to defend a satisfactory account of how we could come to 
know about the world on the basis of perception. As a further compo-
nent of that very same project, McDowell is also, notoriously, commit-
ted to the view that "capacities that belong to reason ... be operative in 
experiencing itself'. 61 
ceptual capacities, indiscriminable hallucinations merely seem to the subject to draw 
on those same conceptual capacities. This strikes me as a difficult and somewhat 
ad hoc position to take: what is the difference between actually drawing on a 
conceptual capacity and merely seeming to the subject to draw on a conceptual 
capacity? 
57 Seefn.17. 
58 See, for example, Travis (2005). 
59 See, for example, Byme/Logue (2008). 
60 Another objection which has been brought against Martin's view is that it does 
not leave sufficient resources to give a robust account of hallucinations. See 
Burge (2005), Fish (2008), Brewer (2008) and Siegel (2008). If my argument 
below is correct, it will also follow that McDowell's version of disjunctivism 
won't fall prey to this criticism. 
61 McDowell (2008a), 258. 
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I won't now rehearse the reasons that McDowell has for thinking 
that an adequate account of perception requires the idea that perceptual 
experience itself draws on conceptual capacities. For my purposes, it will 
suffice to observe that, for McDowell, a satisfactory account of how 
perceptual experience can put us in touch with the world must maintain 
both: (a) the idea that perceptual experiences involve actualizations of 
perceptual capacities and (b) disjunctivism. If Martin's were the only 
form of disjunctivism available, then McDowell could not hold both 
(a) and (b) together. McDowell, from Martin's point of view, must 
abandon one of his commitments. 
One response here is to abandon the idea that Martin and McDo-
well both attempt to defend the position I outlined in §2. This would 
be an overreaction. McDowell can consistently maintain both (a) and 
(b) because Martin is simply wrong to conclude that they are incompat-
ible: in particular, Martin is wrong to think that defending disjunctivism 
requires insisting that the only sense in which veridical and non-verid-
ical perceptions 'have something in common' is trivial. 
McDowell defends a conception of perception according to which 
there are non-trivial features shared by veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptions62 -in the case of Smith sitting in the London pub, both the ve-
ridical perception she in fact has and the indistinguishable hallucination 
she might have both draw on her concept lemon. This, I contended in 
§5.1, is sufficient to violate Martin's condition (III) on disjunctivism. 
Given our work in §3.2, we are now in a position to see exactly why 
Martin thinks the disjunctivist should not admit that Smith's veridical 
perception and her indiscriminable hallucination share this feature. To 
do so is to make So-Called Naive Realist veridical perceptions explana-
torily redundant in an account of consciousness and mind. Rehearsing 
the reasoning of §3.2, appropriately modified for the case at hand: the 
explanation of Smith's ordering a G&T in the situation where she mere-
ly hallucinates a lemon will appeal to the kind of experience she is hav-
ing-that kind of experience which draws on the concept lemon. But 
since she is also having an experience of that kind when she actually per-
ceives a lemon, it is, Martin contends, overwhelmingly natural to con-
clude that when we are called upon to explain her ordering of a gin and 
tonic in the case where she has had a veridical perception of a lemon, it 
is this fact about her experience (that her experience is merely one 
which involves the concept lemon) which does the explanatory work 
62 He is insistent about this in McDowell (2010). 
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(rather than the fact that her experience is a veridical perception of a 
lemon). 
We are also now in a position to see how McDowell can reject this 
line of thought. We've seen that what I called the Knowledge Premise 
plays a critical role in McDowell's disjunctivism. 63 According to the 
Knowledge Premise, a subject who is having a veridical perception 
has a different episternic standing than a subject who merely seems to 
be having a veridical perception. In Situation 1, Smith is justified in be-
lieving that she sees a lemon. In Situation 2, although Smith believes she 
sees a lemon, she is not justified in this belie£ 
Let us suppose then that in both Situation 1 and Situation 2, Smith 
comes to believe that she sees a lemon. Suppose further that in both 
cases, her experience draws on her concept lemon. How can McDowell 
explain why she forms the belief she does? In Situation 1, Smith believes 
that she sees a lemon because she sees a lemon. In Situation 2, Smith 
believes that she sees a lemon merely because she takes herself to see 
a lemon. Although she has the same belief in the two cases, our explan-
ation of her corning to form that belief is different in the two cases be-
cause her epjsternic standing is different (in virtue of the fact that her 
experiences are different): in the one case, we explain her belief by ap-
pealing to the fact that her belief is justified by an experience which 
presents to her a lemon, in the second case we explain her belief by 
pointing to the fact that she takes her belief to be justified, in virtue 
of an experience which merely seems to present a lemon to her. 
The fact that a difference in justificatory standing leads to a differ-
ence in how we explain Smith's patterns of belief formation will also 
allow us to explain the differences in Smith's behaviour in the two 
cases. In Situation 1, Smith ordered a gin and tonic because she saw a 
lemon and this led her to crave that drink. In Situation 2, Smith ordered 
a gin and tonic because she took herself to see a lemon, and that led her 
to crave the drink. 
Martin issued a challenge for the disjunctivist who wishes to main-
tain that there can be a non-trivial characterization of what veridical and 
non-veridical perceptions 'have in common'. The challenge was this: 
"[W]hat shows that what is relevant to the explanations we want to 
give is ever the kind of event peculiar to veridical perception rather 
than what is common to veridical perception and causally matching hal-
63 Although I urged that we should not identify it with McDowell's disjunctivism. 
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lucination ?"64 Although it isn't clear that Martin takes any actual philos-
ophers to fall into the range of his challenge, I've argued that McDowell 
is the kind of disjunctivist at whom Martin's challenge can be directed. 
But McDowell can answer the challenge: in virtue of the different ex-
periences they are, veridical perceptions have a different justificatory 
standing than non-veridical perceptions, and therefore they have a dif-
ferent explanatory status in our account of consciousness and mind. 
6 Conclusion 
In §2, I offered a conception of disjunctivism which I take to be neutral 
between Martin and McDowell. In §3 and §4, I outlined the different 
ways that Martin and McDowell implement this basic disjunctivist proj-
ect. If my reconstruction is correct, it is both wrong to think (as some 
have) that Martin and McDowell are simply engaged in the same proj-
ect, but also wrong to think (as some have) that they are engaged in es-
sentially different projects. In §5, I drew attention to a specific way in 
which the disjunctivisms of Martin and McDowell are incompatible. 
Martin thinks that the disjunctivist will be required to defend the 
view that there can be no non-trivial way of characterizing what it is 
that a veridical and a non-veridical perception 'have in common'. So 
Martin's form of disjunctivism rules out any account according to 
which perceptions themselves involve representational or conceptual 
content. If Martin is right, no philosopher who thinks that perceptions 
have representational or conceptual content can be a disjunctivist. Mar-
tin is wrong about this conclusion. McDowell is a disjunctivist who 
maintains that perceptions 'draw on' conceptual capacities. I've argued 
that McDowell can hold this view without inconsistency. McDowell 
avoids inconsistency because he can respond to a rhetorical question 
Martin poses. Martin thinks that any disjunctivist who wants to admit 
that veridical and non-veridical perceptions can, non-trivially, 'have 
something in common' will face the unenviable task of explaining 
how disjunctivist-approved veridical perceptions do not become ex-
planatorily redundant. McDowell can respond to this challenge: even 
if there is a significant way of characterizing what a world-involving ve-
ridical perception and an indistinguishable hallucination 'have in com-
64 Martin (2006), 369. 
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mon', the veridical perception will not be explanatorily redundant be-
cause it will have very different justificatory force. 
Many have been persuaded by Martin's claim that disjunctivism can-
not admit a non-trivial characterization of what veridical and non-ve-
ridical perceptions 'have in common', and some have criticized disjunc-
tivism in the light of this claim. I've argued that McDowell's is a species 
of disjunctivism which is not subject to these criticisms. But the con-
temporary literature on disjunctivism has tended to focus on Martin's 
very distinctive understanding of what veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptions have 'in common', and the metaphysical presuppositions which 
this claim requires. Martin's bold metaphysical claims have thus hijacked 
the debate about disjunctivism. I've shown that Martin's is only one way 
to implement the generic disjunctivist project of §2, and when seen in 
this way, it is clear that his claims about what veridical and non-veridical 
perceptions 'have in common' are-far from representing the core of 
disjunctivism-only a curious feature of one of its species. The point 
of this paper is to arrive at a vantage point from which it is evident 
that McDowell's disjunctivism is equally a way to implement the project 
of §2, but one which avoids the difficult and attention-grabbing meta-
physical flourishes of Martin's species. From this vantage point, McDo-
well's species of disjunctivism emerges as a far more appealing instantia-
tion of the genus.65 
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